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Abstract: Although empirical evidence shows that the relationship between
foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade is complex, theories of international
investment (both vertical and horizontal) present simple patterns of relation.
By allowing for diﬀerent locations of vertically-related stages of production
and distinguishing between trade in ﬁnished goods and trade in intermediate
goods, this paper introduces a nonmonotonic relationship between multinational
ﬁrms and trade costs, which must be neither too high nor too low for FDI to
arise. Exports and FDI behave as complements for high levels of trade costs
and as substitutes otherwise.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Empirical studies such as those by PAIN and WAKELIN (1998) and PANTULU
and POON (2003) show that the relationship between outward foreign direct
investment (FDI) and exports is a complex one.1 FDI and trade are neither
substitutes nor complements: the nature of the relationship depends on the
industry, the country and the time period concerned.
Moreover, the relationship between trade costs and FDI is not simple either.
It is generally agreed that an important share of FDI is ”tariﬀ-jumping”, i.e.
it aims to bypass national or regional barriers to trade. However, the general
increase of investment ﬂows in relation to world production has been consistent
with an overall decrease of trade costs in the world economy, namely through
the formation of wide regional integration areas, such as NAFTA and the EU.
The standard theories of FDI do not agree with this complexity because they
assume monotonic relationships between FDI and trade, on the one hand, and
between FDI and trade costs, on the other hand.
The theory of vertical investment (HELPMAN, 1984) assumes that, with
close to zero transport costs, FDI will take the form of a separation of head-
quarters and plant in order to make full use of international diﬀerences in pro-
duction factor prices. FDI creates trade in the form of exports of capital goods
and factor services from the headquarters to the plant, which in turn exports
resource-based products to the home country.
The theory of horizontal investment (HORSTMANN and MARKUSEN,
1992, BRAINARD, 1993) assumes that the ﬁrm faces a trade-oﬀ between con-
centration and proximity to consumers. If economies of scale are high and trade
costs are low, it is proﬁtable for the ﬁrm to concentrate production in a single
plant and to supply foreign markets through exports. Otherwise, if economies
of scale in production are low and trade costs are high, it pays for the ﬁrm to
supply each national market through a plant located in it. FDI substitutes
trade and increases with the level of trade costs.
In this paper, we present a model of FDI that shows a nonmonotonic re-
lationship between investment and trade creation and between investment and
trade costs. The model combines features from horizontal and vertical theories
and was ﬁrst suggested by BRAINARD (1993), who sugggested decomposing
the activity of the ﬁrm into ”manufacturing” (or upstream production) and
”distribution and sales” (or downstream production). Each of these vertically-
related stages has its own economies of scale/trade costs trade-oﬀ. If both stages
are decentralized across markets, FDI substitutes for trade. But if the upstream
stage remains centralized while the downstream activity is decentralized, FDI
creates trade in intermediate goods. In the following section, we attempt to
model this intuition by means of a noncooperative game.
1Inward FDI usually promotes exports as a subsidiary of a mulinational corporation usu-
ally targets countries that are neighboring to the host country in the context of a regional
integration area. On the other hand, inward investment is usually positively related with the
the range of goods produced in the host economy, thus widening potential foreign markets.
22 The model
2.1 Assumptions
The spatial economy obeys the following assumptions:
1. There are two countries, Home (H)a n dF o r e i g n( F), each with the same
number n of consumers. By convention, the distance between H and F is
1 and the distance between two locations in the same country is 0.
2. There are two vertically-related ﬁrms, Upstream (U)a n dD o w n s t r e a m( D)
that have headquarters in country H. U produces an intermediate good
that is used by D in order to produce a consumer good. D uses α units
of the input to produce one unit of the ﬁnished good.
3. Trade costs per unit of distance of the intermediate good and of the con-
sumer good vary in proportion. Without loss of generality, we assume
that they have a common rate t.
4. The transport costs of the goods are supported by the buyers, both inter-
mediate and ﬁnal.
5. The ﬁrms compete only through the choice of locations of plants. Prices of




and of the consumer good (p) are parametric.
6. The production of the intermediate good has strong economies of scale that
make it indivisible. Firm U can either run a single plant (at a constant
unit production cost cu) or stay out of the market.
7. The production of the consumer good has less important, but still signiﬁ-
cant, economies of scale. Firm D can choose between running one plant
(in country H), running two plants (one in each country) or staying out
of the market. The ﬁrm incurs a ﬁxed cost G per plant besides a constant
marginal cost cD.
8. Consumers have a 0−1 demand function with a reservation price v.T h e
consumer buys one unit of the ﬁnished good if the delivered price (mill
price plus transport cost) does not exceed the reservation price.
2.2 The game in normal form
The economy can be modelled as a static noncooperative game with two players
U and D.F i r m U has two pure strategies: exit the market (strategy ”stay
out”) or set up one indivisible plant (strategy ”1”). Firm D has three pure
strategies: exit the market (strategy ”stay out”), set up one plant in country H
(strategy ”1”) or set up two plants in countries H and F (strategy ”2”). The
3game matrix has the form
D
Stay Out 12
U Stay Out (1) (2) (3)
1 (4) (5) (6)
(1)
The payoﬀsa r e :
(1)
PU (Stay Out, Stay Out)=0
PD (Stay Out, Stay Out)=0
(2)
PU (Stay Out, 1)=0
PD (Stay Out, 1)=−G
(3)
PU (Stay Out, 2)=0
PD (Stay Out, 2)=−2G
(4)
PU (1, Stay Out)=0
PU (1, Stay Out)=0
In order to assess the payoﬀsi nc e l l s( 5 )a n d( 6 )o fm a t r i x1 ,i ti sn e c e s s a r y
to make a distinction between two cases.
In the ﬁrst case, trade costs are low ( p + t ≤ v), so that a plant of ﬁrm D
in the home country can export to consumers in the foreign country. In this
case, the demand addressed to ﬁrm D is 2n. Hence, we have:
(5)




PD (1,1) = 2n
¡








PD (1,2) = 2n
¡
p − cD − αk
¢
− αnt − 2G
where αnt is the trade cost of the intermediate good to the plant of ﬁrm D
in the foreign country.
In the second case, trade costs are high (p + t>v ), so that a plant of ﬁrm
D located in the home country cannot sell to consumers in the foreign country.
In this case, payoﬀs become:
(5)




PD (1,1) = n
¡








PU (1,2) = 2n
¡
p − cD − αk
¢
− αnt − 2G
4Without loss of generality, we make the following parameter speciﬁcations:
k = p =1








We are left with two general parameters: market size n and trade cost t.
The payoﬀ matrix in the two cases becomes:
Case t ≤ 1
2 D
Stay Out 12
U Stay Out 0,00 ,−10 ,−2
























(Stay Out, Stay Out) is a Nash equilibrium for any values of n and t.B u t
it is not a reasonable solution. It is a nonstrict and dominated equilibrium, as
”Stay Out” is a weakly dominated strategy for ﬁrm U, which implies that the
productive activity in the economy is nonexistent.
We tried to ﬁnd other Nash equilibria with positive production. The set of
such equilibria in the space of parameters (t,n) i sp l o t t e di nF i g u r e1 .
( Figure 1, Page 8)
2.3 Interpretation of the results
In Figure 1, if market size n is too low for ﬁrm D to break even, the only
equilibrium is the one where the upstream and downstream ﬁrms exit the market
and production does not exist.
If trade costs are low (t ≤ 1
2), there can be trade in ﬁnished goods which
otherwise cannot exist.
FDI by the consumer goods ﬁrm occurs for high values of market size n,
because the establishment of a plant in the foreign country entails a ﬁxed cost
that must be met by a suﬃcient local demand. This is a usual result (see
ROWTHORN, 1993).
5It is less usual from the viewpoint of the theory of horizontal investment that
the multinational ﬁrm should arise for medium rather than high trade costs. The
relationship between FDI and trade costs is nonmonotonic. In order for ﬁrm
D to become multi-plant, trade costs cannot be too low. Otherwise it would
be more proﬁtable for ﬁrm D to concentrate production in the home country
and export ﬁnished goods to the foreign country. But trade costs cannot be too
high either. Otherwise the supply of intermediate goods by ﬁrm U placed in the
home country to the decentralized plant of ﬁrm D in the foreign country would
not be feasible.
Considering in more detail the region of the parameter space where market
size is high enough (n>4), so that multi-plant production is feasible, let it be
assumed that trade costs fall from an initial high level. Then, there are two
successive transitions. Firstly, we have (1,1) ⇒ (1,2): a decrease in trade costs
creates FDI and trade by making exports of intermediate goods feasible. FDI
and trade are complements. Secondly, we have (1,2) ⇒ (1,1): the fall in trade
costs removes FDI and the trade in intermediate goods and it creates a trade
in ﬁnished goods. Because the trade in consumer goods exceeds the volume
of trade in intermediate goods, on balance the fall of trade costs in this case
enhances trade and lowers FDI. Hence FDI and trade behave as substitutes.
3C o n c l u s i o n s
The distinction between trade in intermediate and trade in ﬁnished goods en-
abled us to establish nonmonotonic relationships between FDI and trade, and
FDI and trade costs. This analysis can be extended in two ways. A ﬁrst exten-
sion would be to assume that the demand for the consumer good is continuously
elastic. A second extension would be to allow ﬁrms to select prices endogenously.
However, it is likely that these generalizations would not qualitatively change
the conclusions of this paper.
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